The Analysis of Norms in Statements on Interfaith Relations

Simon M. Haas

What makes for an effective and enduring statement on interfaith relations? What principles should one apply in formulating such a text? This article identifies the need to focus on norms in the drafting and critical assessment of such formal documents. It demonstrates how norms form the basis of every functional statement on interfaith relations. Neglect of the normative dimension in the creation of such a document, the author argues, diminishes the value of the document correspondingly and gives birth to a formal text that has less than complete integrity. The author then illustrates how a normative analysis tends to expose internal pressures, ambiguities, and contradictions in a formal text. Attention to norms therefore helps tighten drafting and offers a compelling, if not a necessary, approach for the critical analysis of statements on interfaith relations.

Even political states, though different in culture and competing with one another, maintain diplomatic relations and strive for coexistence. Only religions are not on speaking terms. Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–72)¹

Introduction

In an increasingly pluralistic world, religious organisations need to be able to co-exist peacefully. Indeed, they often find they have much to gain through dialogue and collaboration with each other. To such ends, a religious group or organisation may draft and circulate an official statement, declaration, or set of guidelines on interfaith relations. Since 1965, the year Pope Paul VI proclaimed Nostra Aetate – the most significant such document by the Roman Catholic Church – there has been a rise in formal statements on interfaith relations, particularly in the United States.² This has opened up a fresh area of study and has raised new questions: What makes for an effective and enduring statement on interfaith relations? How should one assess such formal documents? What principles should one apply in their drafting?

This article aims to demonstrate the importance of attention to norms in the interpretation and critical analysis of formal statements on interfaith relations. Put simply, norms are ‘ought’ statements, used by a society or group for identifying appropriate and inappropriate values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. The purpose of this article is to introduce a sound analytical and hermeneutic framework for the drafting and study of such documents. A failure to treat the dimension of norms, it will be argued, is to undermine the document’s ultimate efficacy. As we shall see, it is to produce an official statement that correspondingly lacks full integrity.

In exploring the normative dimension of statements on interfaith relations, we will draw principally on two specific documents for illustrative purposes. The first is Vatican II’s historic ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions’, better known as Nostra Aetate.³ The second is ‘ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’⁴, the first official statement on interfaith relations by the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).

Proclaimed by Pope Paul VI on 28 October 1965, Nostra Aetate was momentous both for the Roman Catholic Church internally and for its relation to other religions, particularly Judaism. It marked a distinct shift in direction, ‘a fundamental novelty with respect to two millennia of contradictions of a view and of a practice decisively negative’.⁵ The four decades that followed Nostra Aetate witnessed not only an increase in dialogue between Catholics and representatives of other faiths but also further progressive change in the field of biblical studies and a full revision of Roman Catholic textbooks in terms of how Jews and Judaism were portrayed.⁶ Other religious organisations – Christian and non-Christian alike – began crafting their own statements, guidelines, principles, and declarations on interfaith relations.⁷ One of these was ISKCON, which first published its statement in June 1999.

The Roman Catholic Church and ISKCON have both traditionally been avidly mission-based.⁸ But whereas the Roman Catholic Church is a long-established religious organisation, ISKCON, founded on 13 July 1966, is still a relatively young organisation, even if it represents one strand of the much older Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. The Roman Catholic Church is, of course, also much larger than ISKCON, with 1.131 billion members in 2007.⁹ Whereas the Roman Catholic Church to this day retains a strong and stable central leadership, ISKCON today has a significantly weakened central leadership, as we shall see.¹⁰ Both institutions’ documents on interfaith relations were historic, representing a distinct shift in direction or approach.¹¹ These immediate points of similarity and difference between the Roman Catholic Church and ISKCON render their documents on interfaith relations particularly interesting for the purpose of joint illustration.

Statements on interfaith relations: What do we mean?

It is important to distinguish at the outset between an ‘interfaith statement’ and a ‘statement on interfaith relations’.¹² An interfaith statement is a joint statement by two or more religious organisations on a shared cause or matter of common concern. A statement on interfaith relations, by contrast, is a statement usually by a single religious organisation on its relations with the members of one or more other religious organisations. Although the normative approach set forth in this article could easily be applied to any formal religious or political statement that asserts the values, beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours of an organisation or its members, it is statements on interfaith relations that this article will specifically explore.

Formal documents on interfaith relations may, of course, be cast in a variety of forms and may carry different appellations. They may, for instance, be referred to as ‘guidelines’, ‘principles’, ‘statements’, ‘declarations’, ‘proclamations’, or even ‘edicts’ or ‘decrees’. In its nascent stages, Nostra Aetate moved from decree to declaration (the latter being more significant a legislative act in the Roman Catholic Church).¹³ For religious organisations that do not have an intricate or developed legislative tradition, such documents may simply be known as statements. In referring to ‘statements on interfaith relations’, we will seek broadly to capture all such documents, whatever their nomenclature. There may be important ‘juridical’ differences between the instruments employed, which often cannot be ignored, but we will be interested here primarily in the commonality of such documents, the aim being to build a broad analytical framework for their drafting and study.

The purpose of statements on interfaith relations

To meaningfully assess or evaluate a statement on interfaith relations, we need to begin by examining its purpose. As concepts, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ do not exist in a vacuum: they flow from a determination of the purpose of an enterprise.

A formal statement on interfaith relations generally has two direct purposes:

1. To model the values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of its members in relation to members of other religious organisations; and

2. To reach out to partners in dialogue, usually by providing reassurances of good intentions.

The first direct purpose, which we will call P1, captures the normative dimension of such an enterprise. Norms are implicit or explicit orders and permissions used by a group, the disregarding of which may lead to some form of punishment or sanctions. Legal norms, for instance, are usually enforced by sanctions imposed by the state, such as fines, community service, or incarceration. Sanctions for breach of social norms usually range anywhere from mild disapproval to expulsion from a group. Compliance with norms may attract rewards, even if such rewards take the form only of approval from others in the group.

The second direct purpose of a statement on interfaith relations, which we will call P2, carries an anticipatory or expectancy dimension. Norms create correlative expectancies as to how those persons who are governed or guided by them will behave. Accordingly, a statement on interfaith relations is, at least in relation to P2, a communication to potential dialogue partners that helps create a framework for discussion by setting expectancies.

A statement on interfaith relations may or may not expressly articulate P1 and P2. ‘ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’, for instance, does so clearly in the following passage:

This statement serves as a declaration of purpose and a significant basis for relationship with ISKCON’s dialogue partners. For ISKCON’s members it provides clear principles, guidelines, and perspectives for relationships with members of other faiths.¹⁴

Statements on interfaith relations will necessarily also have one or more indirect purposes. These are the reasons – which may well be unstated, political, or even personal – for pursuing P1 and P2. It is worth observing that P1 and P2 are not pursued for their own sake: a religious organisation does not try to alter the behaviour of its members simply for the sake of altering their behaviour. It does so for other specific reasons. For instance, the intelligentsia of a religious organisation may urge reform on the premise that the organisation is less likely to take root in society, or even survive, if it remains exclusivist. As Mahatma Gandhi famously remarked, ‘A culture cannot survive if it attempts to be exclusive.’¹⁵ Perhaps the organisation has recently experienced the benefits of interfaith dialogue and cooperation and now sees value in promoting that. In the case of Nostra Aetate, Pope John XXIII, who commissioned the first draft (entitled Decretum de Judaeis, ‘Decree on the Jews’), had saved Jewish lives during the Holocaust.¹⁶ He came to embrace the axiom that the gospel is betrayed whenever it is turned into an instrument of hate and indifference, and felt the need for fundamental reform in Catholic teaching. His view was shared by other Church leaders, among whom some had fought in the resistance movements in Europe during the Nazi period.¹⁷

In building an analytical framework we will ignore these various indirect purposes. This is because they tend to be specific to the particular political, social, and historical circumstances of the moment. Moreover, these indirect purposes can be ambiguous and open to conflicting interpretations; they can even be personal to the principal protagonists involved at the time. This is an area that is therefore better left to the historian. While historical research is undoubtedly of paramount importance to an accurate and contextualised understanding of a statement on interfaith relations, the findings of such research are likely to be too situation-specific for the present purposes. Accordingly, it is to P1 and P2 that we will direct our attention.

Nostra Aetate and ISKCON’s statement as sets of norms

Nostra Aetate, being a conciliary declaration, is an official legislative act of the Vatican. Thus, its very form attests to its normative content. Similarly, ISKCON’s statement on interfaith relations describes itself as an ‘official statement’ that is ‘authorised by the ISKCON’s GBC (Governing Body Commission) Executive Committee’.¹⁸ The GBC is the organisation’s highest decision-making body. That the material is presented as ‘principles’ and ‘guidelines’ does not detract from the statement’s normative function and character. Norms can offer considerable discretion as to application and are frequently capable of being subject to varying interpretations.

The most obvious way to express norms is through imperatives, as in Part Four of ISKCON’s document (e.g. ‘Always be honest and truthful’, ‘Always remain respectful…’, ‘Be prepared to listen to others…’). However, whether an expression expresses a norm is dependent not on its linguistic form but on its meaning. Accordingly, declarative sentences can also articulate norms. Indeed, such sentences are used in many laws. In Nostra Aetate, sentences like the following are clearly normative: ‘The Church reproves, as foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of life, or religion.’¹⁹ Similarly, Part One of ISKCON’s statement begins with the declarative words, ‘In ISKCON, we consider… [X]’. The implicit message is that if a person does not consider X, he or she is not in ISKCON. Clearly, this sentence is prescriptive.

The Roman Catholic Church has not historically held the position set out in Nostra Aetate. Quite the contrary. In 1442, for instance, Pope Eugene IV proclaimed unabashedly in his Papal Bull Cantate Domino:

[The Council of Florence] firmly believes, professes and proclaims that those not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans but also Jews and heretics and schismatics, cannot participate in eternal life, but will depart ‘into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels’, unless before the end of life the same have been added to the flock. … [N]o one, whatever almsgiving he has practiced, even if he has shed blood for the name of Christ, can be saved, unless he has remained in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church.²⁰

Nostra Aetate therefore represented a distinct shift in direction. To quote Cardinal Walter Kasper, ‘After a long and sad history of indifference, misunderstanding, discrimination, denunciation, oppression and persecution, this Declaration was and is an historical breakthrough.’²¹

ISKCON has not promulgated any edicts like Cantate Domino. Nonetheless, it has been argued that ISKCON too, with its strong sense of mission, has not historically held the position set out in its statement on interfaith relations.²² Rather, its document represents a new, progressive, and inclusive approach. As ‘the first official statement’ on the subject, it is not merely a reflection of an historic ethos already firmly embedded in the religious organisation. Rather, it is a more recent development backed by the leaders of the organisation that is intended in part to alter attitudes and behaviours at a grass-roots level.

One way to educe this is through the notion of direction of fit in speech act theory, developed by J. L. Austin and John Searle.²³ Imagine I am given a shopping list and sent to the supermarket. What I bring back will have to match what is on my list. In other words, the list is intended to have a world-to-words direction of fit. If there is a lack of fit between world and words (e.g. I purchased butter when the list says ‘margarine’), I would not then correct this by amending the list; rather, I would be expected to go buy the missing items. Norms have this direction of fit. If you tend to pick up speeding tickets in your neighbourhood, you would not head out at night with a paintbrush to convert the speed limit signs from a ‘30’ to ‘80’. Rather, you would alter your conduct as a driver to conform to the legal norm.

Of course, many spoken and written messages do not have a world-to-words direction of fit. Some are intended to accurately describe the world. For instance, if, while in the supermarket, I am being followed by a detective who is writing down everything I purchase, the detective’s list will exhibit a words-to-world direction of fit. In other words, if the detective makes an error (e.g. notes down ‘butter’, when I have really selected margarine), the detective would not approach me at the till and demand that my purchase conform to his list. Rather, he would alter his record.

It is illuminating to apply the notion of direction of fit to statements on interfaith relations, which exhibit a world-to-words, rather than a words-to-world, direction of fit. Take, for instance, the following passage from Part Two of ISKCON’s statement: ‘members of the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement … value qualities such as humility, tolerance … honesty, and personal integrity’.²⁴ If there is a lack of fit between the propositional content of the passage and the conduct of a particular member of the organisation, one would not then alter the passage; rather, the particular member would be encouraged or expected to adjust his conduct. In other words, to achieve success of fit, the world (i.e., the behaviour of the organisation’s members) must change to match the propositional content of the passage. This then underscores the primacy of the normative dimension of such statements, even if there happens to be a close fit between words and world.²⁵

The primacy of the normative dimension

To explore the significance of the normative dimension, let us examine whether a statement on interfaith relations can serve only one of its two direct purposes, P1 and P2. In doing so, let us consider two different scenarios: the first is where there is perfect fit between words and world; the second is where there is not. The concept of perfect fit is idealistic, but it serves as a useful tool for analysis here.

If a statement on interfaith relations is intended to serve P1 only and there is perfect fit between words and world, the document becomes redundant. There would clearly be existing powerful forces – perhaps long-standing and deeply-rooted unwritten social or religious norms – at work, with little or no confusion as to their content. Any formal statement or decree would not in these circumstances bring any added value. However, if there is not perfect fit, then a formal statement could be of value by helping to guide or shape behaviour.

Let us suppose now that a statement on interfaith relations is intended to serve P2 only. If there is perfect fit between words and world, the document again becomes redundant – on the premise that actions speak louder than words. Members of other faiths need only interact with the members of the particular religious group or organisation in question to understand their intent, mood, and ethos. In such a scenario of perfect fit, there is no confusion necessitating a formal statement. If, however, there is not a perfect fit and if there is also no analogous internal document that matches the propositional content of the statement, then it is hard to escape the conclusion that in such circumstances, the statement is in fact cosmetic. Such a statement would be a public relations fix that is at least to some degree empty of content, and it might be expected to die in time, its lack of integrity exposed.

Table 1: The status of a statement on interfaith relations that is intended to serve only a single direct purpose (either P1 or P2) in a scenario of perfect fit and not perfect fit

If we tabulate the results of this reasoning (see Diagram 1), we observe, first, that a statement on interfaith relations will actually serve a function in relation to P1 and P2 only when there is a lack of fit between words and world – that is to say, when the statement itself is not a faithful description of the nature of current interfaith relations. We also observe that a worthwhile statement on interfaith relations must be intended to have a normative dimension (P1). Indeed, the expectancy dimension (P2) takes its meaning from, and cannot exist independently of, the normative dimension (P1). This then leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the crafting of a functional statement on interfaith relations, a statement that is more than cosmetic or redundant, must begin at the normative level. So too, then, must the study of such statements.

Analytical benefits of a focus on norms

Having identified Nostra Aetate and ISKCON’s statement as sets of norms, where does this then lead us? How does it shed further light on these documents? By examining the types of norms a statement on interfaith relations creates, the source of their legitimacy, their doctrinal support and fit with tradition, their internal coherence, and their likely sanctions and rewards, one can determine the likelihood of their de facto acceptance and durability in a religious group or organisation. In particular, a normative analysis tends to identify and highlight internal conflicts and intra-systematic questions in a text. Such an examination will, as a consequence, allow us also to assess whether or not a statement on interfaith relations will in the longer term succeed in advancing P2 – to reach out to dialogue partners. This is because the expectancy dimension of such a statement flows from its normative dimension.

If, for instance, a sufficiently large number of active members in a religious organisation were to persistently ignore the norms in its statement on interfaith relations in their daily encounters with members of other faiths, this would eventually undermine any early progress in reaching out to dialogue partners. Thus, an examination of the norms in a statement on interfaith relations tells you about the chances of success of such a statement with regard to both P1 and P2.

Locating a basis of legitimacy

Norms are more likely to be followed if there is a real threat of sanctions for breach. Clearly, there will not be any real threat of sanction if a statement on interfaith relations is intended to serve P2 only – in other words, if it is not intended to be normative in the first place. Norms are also more likely to be followed if it is difficult to justify breaking them. One way to justify norm-breaking behaviour is to attack the values that underpin those norms. Another is to appeal to the values that underpin those norms but to argue that the norm-breaking behaviour better expresses those values, either generally or in a particular case. It is important to assess how resilient norms are to such pressures.

There are various kinds of norms – legal norms, social norms, political norms, institutional norms, moral norms, religious norms. A given norm will frequently fit into more than one category. The law against murder, for instance, is also one of the Ten Commandments (‘Thou shall not kill’); it is a moral norm by most people’s accounts of morality, whether or not those people are religious. Nostra Aetate opposes ‘any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of life, or religion’.²⁶ In Great Britain, this norm is partially captured by the Race Relations Act of 1976 (as amended and extended), which makes it unlawful to discriminate, harass, or victimise persons in the workplace on the basis of race or colour.²⁷ Natural law theorists argue that there is a necessary connection between law and morality. Legal positivists argue that there is no necessary connection between the two, but they maintain that the content of law and morality in any given society frequently coincide. The definition and boundaries of some of these different categories of norms are thus a subject of some ongoing debate.

What we are interested in, however, at least initially, is not so much the overlap between categories of norms as the particular normative source (or sources) to which a statement on interfaith relations appeals. Generally, one might expect such a statement to appeal primarily to religious doctrine, with the express aim of creating religious norms. Such doctrine, usually regarded within a religion as the word of God or his representatives, is after all the firmest anchorage for norms in most religious organisations. But as we shall see, statements on interfaith relations sometimes also appeal, either directly or obliquely, to other normative sources – such as morality or the politico-religious institution itself.

Difficulties with a theological underpinning

A weak theological underpinning can expose a statement on interfaith relations to attack by allowing a detractor to invoke a religious norm that overrides the norms in the statement itself. For an individual who is religious, religious norms are generally at the top of the hierarchy of norms. This means that if there is a serious and irreconcilable conflict between a religious norm and a norm of some other kind, the religious norm will generally trump the other norm. An exception is perhaps a conflicting legal norm, although even legal norms are sometimes broken on religious grounds (e.g., if such norms are unduly repressive or if members are especially zealous). To avoid being vulnerable, a statement on interfaith relations needs to at least accord with norms at the top of the hierarchy of norms. Generally, this means such a statement must have a robust theological underpinning.

That said, an appeal to religious doctrine is also a double-edged sword. Doctrine is generally regarded within a religion as revelation or truth – unchanging, immutable, free from human defect. By relying on doctrinal support, a religious organisation is necessarily thrown into a dilemma: it must either (1) give the misleading impression in the drafting of the statement that it has always held the position set out in the statement or (2) openly acknowledge that it has previously misconstrued or misapplied doctrine and is now altering course, thereby opening to possible challenge any claims to special standing in matters of doctrinal interpretation. There is a playoff here between integrity and the preservation of the status quo.

The process of bringing a formal statement on interfaith relations to birth can be difficult. This was certainly so with Nostra Aetate, which required numerous drafts and amendments between 1961 and 1965.²⁸ The process is essentially political; champions of a statement may be tempted to frame the statement as a description of what has always been, as this is likely to reduce political resistance to the document. It is perhaps for this reason that neither Nostra Aetate nor ISKCON’s statement expressly acknowledge any change of position. Nostra Aetate, for instance, makes no mention at all of the Church’s long anti-Judaic legacy. In this respect it differs sharply from the formal statement on Lutheran-Jewish relations adopted by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on 18 April 1994, which declares forthrightly:

In the spirit of that truth-telling, we who bear his name and heritage must with pain acknowledge also Luther’s anti-Judaic diatribes and the violent recommendations of his later writings against the Jews. … we reject this violent invective, and yet more do we express our deep and abiding sorrow over its tragic effects on subsequent generations.²⁹

Challenges with other underpinnings

In the search for legitimation, a statement on interfaith relations may look also to other normative sources for support. Although this may be helpful, it also has potential pitfalls. The following sentence in ISKCON’s statement, for instance, arguably appeals to morality per se – that is, to morality that does not derive from or depend upon religious teaching: ‘Other communities and organisations advocating humanitarian, ethical, and moral standards are also valued as being beneficial to society.’³⁰ Gavin D’Costa points out that the proposition is not supported in Part Three of the document by any theological justification.³¹ An appeal to morality per se is, of course, subject to theological challenge, because the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition does not recognise the validity of a system of morality that does not flow from devotion to God.³² In his response to ISKCON’s statement, Gavin D’Costa raises this issue, observing:

From a Vaiṣṇava point of view, devotional relationship to God and cultivation of God consciousness are the proper prerequisites to ethics and right action. However, the document seems to overturn this element in the tradition, and this requires more careful justification than is given.³³

In the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition, theology properly understood is considered supra-moral, supra-institutional and even supra-societal.³⁴ Consequently, to be most secure, what the statement needs is first and foremost a robust theological underpinning, which it has. If the religious norms that flow from such an underpinning happen also to coincide with other types of norms – be they moral³⁵, institutional, or social – then they will enjoy the advantage of also being reinforced by those norms.

Occasionally, statements on interfaith relations lack a clear theological rationale altogether. An example of this is the ‘Episcopal Church USA Principles for Interfaith Dialogue’, approved by the Presiding Bishop’s Advisory Committee on Interfaith Relations in June 1993.³⁶ Such statements may rely wholly on the authority of the body or institution that adopted or approved them. There are obvious weaknesses in this approach. The exception, of course, would be if the body or institution promulgating the statement is of such high ecclesiastical standing as to have the power to create religious norms through its utterances. In the absence of such standing, such official norms would be institutional, not religious, and therefore generally of a lower order of validity in the hierarchy of norms.

If ISKCON’s statement on interfaith relations created institutional norms alone, its force would be significantly diminished. The GBC, ISKCON’s highest decision-making body, was once widely regarded as the spiritually empowered representative of the organisation’s founder. Today, members are divided on this and are far more ready to question institutional policy and norms.³⁷ In the 1970s and early 1980s, almost all members lived in ISKCON’s temples, centres, and farm communities. Today, they are dispersed, better integrated in society, and largely financially independent. The GBC is no longer the ultimate guiding hand in their lives.³⁸ Thus, it is no doubt in recognition of the pre-eminence of doctrine as a basis of legitimacy that ISKCON’s document judiciously devotes a considerable section, the whole of Part Three, to the theological basis for interfaith dialogue.

Identifying internal conflicts and ambiguities

Having identified the basis of a statement on interfaith relations, the next step is to analyse the statement norm by norm, searching for internal pressures, ambiguities and contradictions. For instance, does the statement create norms that are inordinately vague, confusing, impossible to follow, or in conflict with other norms in the statement? Do the norms reveal an uneasy relationship with the organisation’s mission?

Norms can purport to create both obligations and permissions. Applying this distinction between norms can be very telling. For instance, one of the guidelines in ISKCON’s document enjoins, ‘When in dialogue with religious people, you do not have to feel the need to convert them.’³⁹ Notice how this is expressed as a permission, when it could easily have been expressed as an obligation: ‘When in dialogue with religious people, do not try to convert them.’ The permission form here perhaps betrays an underlying conflict between mission and dialogue. Expressed as an obligation, the norm might have been considered too strong by many of ISKCON’s members, given the nature of the organisation’s founding purposes (which Alan Unterman believes ‘make mission and conversion a central feature of ISKCON’s outlook’⁴⁰).

ISKCON’s Interfaith Commission, which developed the organisation’s statement on interfaith relations, was officially formed by a GBC resolution on 3 February 1996. Interestingly, this resolution appears in the official minutes of the annual GBC meeting in a section headed ‘Resolutions Regarding ISKCON Preaching’.⁴¹ The official minutes specifically state that the Commission ‘will not discourage devotees taking initiative to preach on behalf of ISKCON in any less official capacity’. This would seem to indicate that the GBC viewed interfaith dialogue as an extension of ‘preaching’ – an ‘official’ aspect of mission.⁴² As mentioned already, this tension between mission and dialogue is arguably discernible in ISKCON’s statement on interfaith relations itself.

Sometimes norms in a statement on interfaith relations can be difficult to interpret. For instance, one of the guidelines in ISKCON’s statement prescribes: ‘Respect the diet … of others.’⁴³ What exactly does this mean, given the strict vegetarian regimen of Hare Kṛṣṇas? It seems perhaps to conflate respect for a person with respect for his diet.

Generally, difficulties of interpretation spring from vague and indeterminate language. For instance, through semantic ambiguity, the possible interpretations of a clause may be so wide as to make the clause essentially meaningless. Such ambiguity tends also to invite self-referential interpretation. Nostra Aetate, for example, asserts, ‘The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions.’⁴⁴ This raises the question of who is to decide what is ‘true and holy’. Dialogue partners will no doubt consider all of their religious teachings to fit this description. A Catholic, however, will likely consider as ‘true and holy’ only those teachings that are closely similar or identical to Catholic doctrine. Similarly, ISKCON’s statement affirms, ‘We respect the spiritual worth of paths of genuine self-realisation… [emphasis added]’⁴⁵ Again, who decides if a path of self-realisation is genuine?

Semantic ambiguity may spring from the use of polysemic language – words or phrases with multiple, related meanings. For instance, ISKCON’s statement asserts, ‘members of the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement value … moral thought and action’.⁴⁶ The problem (besides the difficulties identified earlier in appealing to morality per se) is that there are different and often conflicting conceptions of morality. According to British social theorist and philosopher W. B. Gallie, morality is an ‘essentially contested concept’ – a concept of sufficient complexity so as to generate continuous and independently unresolvable debate.⁴⁷ Thus, dialogue partner X may be led to believe that members of ISKCON value X’s thought and action, which X regards as moral. Similarly, dialogue partner Y may be led to believe that members of ISKCON value Y’s thought and action, even though X and Y do not consider each other’s thought and action to be moral. Meanwhile, for ISKCON members, the sentence might simply mean ‘members of the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement value their own thought and action’. Thus, the use of polysemic language can result in a false sense of agreement between the parties. Such vagueness in fact uncouples the expectancy dimensions of a statement on interfaith relations from its normative dimension and may justifiably be regarded as mere rhetoric.

Conclusion

As we have seen, attention to the normative content of a statement on interfaith relations tends to reveal internal pressures, ambiguities and contradictions. It does so by focusing attention on whether or not members of an organisation can effectively be guided by the norms in the statement as it is drafted. Thus, it helps to expose problems such as the use of essentially contested concepts, which can lead to self-referential interpretation and a false sense of accord. Clearly, then, a normative analysis can help tighten drafting and aid critical analysis.

The analysis of norms, however, is more than just useful: it is necessary. This is because the normative dimension is the sine qua non of a statement on interfaith relations. The expectancy dimension flows from, and is dependent on, the normative dimension. What this implies is perhaps less self-evident than may first appear: a statement on interfaith relations needs to be intended primarily as an internal document for guiding and shaping the behaviour and attitudes of a religious organisation’s own members. When a statement on interfaith relations is formally adopted by an organisation, it is frequently published on external websites and pulled out at interfaith discussions. But how many religious organisations create and publish such official documents primarily for their own members? When a religious organisation circulates its statement on interfaith relations, how many copies are ordered by or distributed to members of other faiths, and how many copies are ordered by or distributed to the organisation’s own members? These are not always easy questions to face.

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Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37), The UK Statute Law Database [website]. www. statutelaw.gov.uk. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

‘Declaration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to the Jewish Community’, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (18 Apr. 1994). <http://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/interreligious/jewish/declaration.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Defarrai, Roy J., trans., Enchiridion Symbolorum, in The Sources of Catholic Drama, ed. Henry Denziger (St. Louis: Herder, 1957).

Dehn, Ulrich and Hans Ucko, ‘Responses to “ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God”’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2000). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/8_1/ index.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

‘Episcopal Church USA Principles for Interfaith Dialogue’ (June 1993), Interfaith Education Initiative: A Manual on Interfaith Dialogue, comp. and ed. Sonia P. Omulepu (Office of Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations of the Episcopal Church, New York).

Froehle, Bryan T. and Mary L. Gautier, Global Catholicism: Portrait of a World Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 2003).

Fumagalli, Pier Francesco, ‘Nostra Aetate: A Milestone’ (November 1997). <http://www.vatican.va/ jubilee_2000/magazine/documents/ju_mag_01111997_p-31_en.html>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

Gallie, W. B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56 (1956), pp. 167–198.

Green, Mitchell, ‘Speech Acts’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/speech-acts/>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

Heschel, Abraham Joshua, ‘No religion is an island’, in No Religion Is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Harold Kasimow and Byron L. Sherwin (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991).

‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004).

‘ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_1/71srd.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

ISKCON Governing Body Commission Society, ‘Minutes of Plenary Meeting’ (Mayapura, West Bengal, 3 Feb. 1996), Resolution 501. <http://www.dandavats.com/wp-content/uploads/ GBCresolutions/GBCRES96.htm>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

ISKCON Governing Body Commission Society, ‘Minutes of Plenary Meeting’ (Mayapura, West Bengal, 5–16 Feb. 1999), ‘Specialized Preaching’, Action Order 201 (‘Islamic Preaching’). <http://www.dandavats.com/wp-content/uploads/GBCresolutions/GBCRES99.htm>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

Kekes, J., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 1977), pp. 71–89.

Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965). <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74), The UK Statute Law Database [website]. <http://www. statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?ActiveTextDocId=2059995>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (c. 1), The UK Statute Law Database [website]. <http://www. statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=2320532>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

Ravindra Svarūpa Dāsa, ‘Religion and Religions’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 1 (June 1993). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/1_1/rsd.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

Rochford, E. Burke, Jr, ‘Prabhupāda Centennial Survey: A Summary of the Final Report’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_1/71rochford.html>. Accessed 9 Feb. 2009.

—— ‘The Changing Face of ISKCON: Family, Congregationalism, and Privatisation’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/9_1/rochford.html>. Accessed 24 Mar. 2009.

‘The Drafting of Nostra Aetate’ (Boston College). <http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/ texts/cjrelations/resources/education/NA_draft_history.htm>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

Resources: Documents on Interfaith Relations

Alliance of Baptists: ‘A Statement on Muslim-Christian Relations from the Alliance of Baptists’ (adopted at Annual Meeting in Vienna, Virginia on 25 Apr. 2003), Connections, Vol. 6, Issue 4 (April 2003). <http://www.sitemason.com/files/cVsnQI/aobapril03.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Anglican Church of Canada: ‘Guidelines for Inter-Faith Dialogue’ (Ecumenical Office of the Anglican Church of Canada, October 1988). <http://www2.anglican.ca/faith/relationships/documents/ifd-guidelines-1988.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009. ‘Guidelines on Worship Involving Christians and People of Other Faith Traditions’ (Task Force of the Faith, Worship, and Ministry Committee of the Anglican Church of Canada; approved by the Council of General Synod Published in 1996). <http://www2.anglican.ca/faith/relationships/documents/ifw-guidelines-1996.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Disciples of Christ (USA and Canada): ‘Report Concerning Disciples of Christ and Interreligious Engagement’ (commended by the 2005 General Assembly meeting in Portland, Oregon). <http://www.disciples.org/Portals/0/PDF/ga/pastassemblies/2005/resolutions/0518.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009. See also ‘Encouraging Interreligious Engagement’ (a resolution adopted by the 2005 General Assembly meeting in Portland, Oregon). <http://www.disciples.org/Portals/0/PDF/ga/ pastassemblies/2005/resolutions/0519.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Episcopal Church (USA): ‘Episcopal Church USA Principles for Interfaith Dialogue’ (approved by the Presiding Bishop’s Advisory Committee on Interfaith Relations in June 1993), Interfaith Education Initiative: A Manual on Interfaith Dialogue, comp. and ed. Sonia P. Omulepu (Office of Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations of the Episcopal Church, New York).

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America: ‘Declaration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to the Jewish Community’ (adopted by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on 18 Apr. 1994). <http://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/interreligious/jewish/declaration.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009. ‘Guidelines for Lutheran-Jewish Relations’ (adopted by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on 16 Nov. 1998). <http://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/interreligious/jewish/guidelines.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom: ‘Statement on Inter-Religious Relations in Britain’ (first published in March 1991; reprinted in 2006). <http://www.interfaith.org.uk/publications/ statement.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness: ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004). First published version: ‘ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_1/71srd.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA: ‘Interfaith Relations and the Churches: A Policy Statement of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.’ (adopted by the NCC General Assembly on 10 Nov. 1999). <http://www.ncccusa.org/interfaith/ifr.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Presbyterian Church (USA): ‘Presbyterian Principles for Interfaith Dialogue’ (adopted by the 211th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA), 1999). <https://www.pcusa.org/ interfaith/toolkit/pdf/ principlesfordialogue.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Roman Catholic Church: ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965). <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

United Church of Christ: ‘The Relationship Between the United Church of Christ and the Jewish Community’ (resolution adopted by the 16th General Synod, 1987). <http://www.ucc.org/education/ polity/pdf-folder/relationship-between-the-ucc-and-the-jewish-community-1987.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009. ‘The Relationship Between the United Church of Christ and the Muslim Community’ (resolution adopted by the 17th General Synod, 1989). <http://www.ucc.org/education/polity/pdf-folder/the-relationship-between-the-ucc-and-the-muslim-community-1989.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

United Methodist Church: ‘Guidelines for Interfaith Dialogue’ (General Commission on Christian Unity and Interreligious Concerns, The United Methodist Church, 2001). <http://www.gccuic-umc.org/web/webpdf/interfaithdialoguebrochure.pdf>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

World Council of Churches: ‘Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies’ (adopted by the World Council of Churches in Chiang Mai, Thailand in 1979). <http://www.beliefnet.com/frameset_offsite.asp?pageloc=http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/ interreligious/glines-e.html&query=&script=/story/89/story_8979_1.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009. See also ‘Taking stock of 30 years of dialogue and revisiting the 1979 Guidelines’, World Council of Churches [website]. <http://www.beliefnet.com/frameset_offsite.asp?pageloc=http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/interreligious/glines-e.html&query=&script=/story/89/story_8979_1.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

Notes

1. Abraham Joshua Heschel, ‘No religion is an island’, in No Religion Is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Harold Kasimow and Byron L. Sherwin (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991), p. 11. A determined advocate of inter-religious dialogue and cooperation, Heschel played an important role behind the scenes in influencing the direction and drafting Nostra Aetate, the Roman Catholic Church’s most significant document on interfaith relations.

2. For a selection of such documents, refer to ‘Resources: Documents on Interfaith Relations’ at the end of this article.

3. Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965). Nostra Aetate means ‘In our time’. Vatican documents, as here, are often referred to by the first words in the official Latin text. Quotations from Nostra Aetate in this article are from the English translation on the Vatican website. <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

4. ‘ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_1/71srd.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009. This document was republished in 2004 with a few modifications: ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004).

5. Pier Francesco Fumagalli, ‘Nostra Aetate: A Milestone’ (November 1997). <http://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000/magazine/documents/ju_mag_01111997_p-31_en.html>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

6. John T. Pawlikowski, ‘The Interfaith Story Behind Nostra Aetate’ [transcript of a talk given on the occasion of the observance of the 40th anniversary of Nostra Aetate] (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 7 Dec. 2005). <http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-12-07/view_transcript.php>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

7. For a selection of such documents, refer to ‘Resources: Documents on Interfaith Relations’ at the end of this article.

8. In relation to ISKCON, see the organisation’s founding purposes in ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 18.

9. Froehle, Bryan T. and Mary L. Gautier, Global Catholicism: Portrait of a World Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 2003), pp. 4–5.

10. See ‘Challenges with other underpinnings’ further on in this article.

11. See footnotes 5, 20, and 21 in this article. See also Kenneth Cracknell, ‘ISKCON and Interfaith Dialogue’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2000). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/ 8_1/index.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

12. The two are occasionally conflated. For instance, see ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 2.

13. ‘The Drafting of Nostra Aetate’ (Boston College). <http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/NA_draft_history.htm>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

14. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), back cover.

15. On his visit to Mahatma Gandhi’s memorial at Rajghat, New Delhi in 1999, Pope John Paul II wrote this line from Mahatma Gandhi in the visitor’s book (‘Pope Leaves Behind a Debate’, The Hindu, 9 Nov. 1999).

16. Judith Banki, et al., ‘The Interfaith Story Behind Nostra Aetate’, transcript of talks given on the occasion of the observance of the 40th anniversary of Nostra Aetate (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 7 Dec. 2005). <http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/ details/2005-12-07/view_transcript.php>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

17. Ibid. John T. Pawlikowski also points to other influences, such as the experience of positive inter-religious collaboration in the United States between Catholics, Protestants and Jews in the 1930s and 1940s.

18. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), inside front cover and back cover.

19. Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965), para. 5.

20. Roy J. Defarrai, trans., Enchiridion Symbolorum, in The Sources of Catholic Drama, ed. Henry Denziger (St. Louis: Herder, 1957), p. 230.

21. Card. Walter Casper, ‘Reflections by Card. Walter Kasper: Some Reflections on “Nostra aetate”’ (November 2001). <http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/card-kasper-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20011123_kasper-nostra-aetate_en.html>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

22. For instance, see Jacqueline Tabick, ‘A Response to “ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God”’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/ icj/7_2/72tabick.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009. See also Kenneth Cracknell, ‘ISKCON and Interfaith Dialogue’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2000). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/ 8_1/index.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

23. For a brief summary of John Searle’s notion of direction of fit in speech act theory, see ‘Speech Acts’ by Mitchell Green in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/speech-acts/>.

24. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 4.

25. Statements on interfaith relations, if formally enacted by a religious organisation, can be regarded as ‘declarations’ in speech act theory, in that such statements themselves serve to set official doctrinal and political positions for the organisation. In speech act theory, a declaration (as when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, ‘I now pronounce you husband and wife’) has both world-to-words and words-to-world direction of fit. Nonetheless, a statement on interfaith relations gives birth to a set of norms, as discussed, and these norms will have a world-to-words direction of fit.

26. Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965), para. 5.

27. Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74), The UK Statute Law Database [website]. <http://www. statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?ActiveTextDocId=2059995>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009. See also the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006.

28. See ‘The Drafting of Nostra Aetate’ (Boston College). <http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/cjrelations/resources/education/NA_draft_history.htm>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2009.

29. ‘Declaration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to the Jewish Community’, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (18 Apr. 1994). <://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/interreligious/jewish/declaration.html>. Accessed 15 Feb. 2009.

30. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 2. The sentence is constructed in the passive voice, with the original subject left out – perhaps to soften the meaning. In failing to specify who it is that values ‘[o]ther communities and organisations advocating humanitarian, ethical, and moral standards’, the statement opens itself to the criticism of using weasel wording. This represents a further weakness in the drafting.

31. Gavin D’Costa, ‘A Response to “ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God”’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_2/72dcosta.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

32. For instance, see A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupāda, Bhagavad-gītā As It Is (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 18.78 and purport. Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism calls the spiritual aspirant to rise to a level beyond the relative morality of this world. Prabhupāda writes, ‘On the mundane platform, what is morality for one person is immorality for another, and what is immorality for one person is morality for another’ (On the Way to Kṛṣṇa, Ch. 2 [Bhaktivedanta VedaBase 2003, Bhaktivedanta Archives, Bhaktivedanta Book Trust] ). Elsewhere, he explains, ‘And if you become mundane moralist, then also you will not be able. You have to become transcendental to all these mundane principles; then it will be possible to become perfectly Kṛṣṇa conscious’ (Lecture on Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Madhya-līlā, 20.125, New York, 27 November 1966 [Bhaktivedanta VedaBase 2003, Bhaktivedanta Archives, Bhaktivedanta Book Trust] ).

33. Gavin D’Costa, ‘A Response to “ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God”’.

34. See footnote 32 in this article.

35. There are different and often conflicting conceptions of morality. According to British social theorist and philosopher W. B. Gallie, morality is an ‘essentially contested concept’ – a concept of sufficient complexity so as to generate continuous and independently unresolvable debate (see W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56 (1956), passim; and J. Kekes, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 1977), p. 71).

36. ‘Episcopal Church USA Principles for Interfaith Dialogue’ (June 1993), Interfaith Education Initiative: A Manual on Interfaith Dialogue, comp. and ed. Sonia P. Omulepu (Office of Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations of the Episcopal Church, New York). An official theological rationale for interfaith dialogue and cooperation is being taken to the General Convention of The Episcopal Church USA in July 2009 (email from Rt. Rev. C. Christopher Epting, Bishop and Deputy for Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations, to S. M. Haas dated 15 Feb. 2009).

37. E. Burke Rochford, Jr, ‘Prabhupāda Centennial Survey: A Summary of the Final Report’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_1/71rochford.html>. Accessed 9 Feb. 2009.

38. Ibid. See also E. Burke Rochford, Jr, ‘The Changing Face of ISKCON: Family, Congregationalism, and Privatisation’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (June 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/ icj/9_1/rochford.html>. Accessed 24 Mar. 2009.

39. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 13.

40. Alan Unterman, ‘A Response to “ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God”’, ISKCON Communications Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 1999). <http://www.iskcon.com/icj/7_2/ 72untrmn.html>. Accessed 9 Jan. 2009.

41. ISKCON Governing Body Commission Society , ‘of Plenary Meeting’ (Māyāpura, West , 3 Feb. 1996), Resolution 501. <http://www.dandavats.com/wp-content/uploads/GBCresolutions/ GBCRES96.htm>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.

42. See also ISKCON Governing Body Commission Society, ‘Minutes of Plenary Meeting’ (Māyāpura, West Bengal, 5–16 Feb. 1999), ‘Specialized Preaching’, Action Order 201 (‘Islamic Preaching’). <http://www.dandavats.com/wp-content/uploads/GBCresolutions/GBCRES99.htm>. Accessed 18 Feb. 2009.The official minutes of this GBC meeting in 1999 state, ‘Any devotee wishing to preach to adherents of Islam are encouraged to co-ordinate their work with Airāvata Prabhu. A branch office of the Interfaith Committee may be established at Māyāpura with Airāvata Prabhu as its co-ordinator of Islamic preaching.’

43. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 12.

44. Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions: Nostra Aetate’ (28 October 1965), para. 2.

45. ‘ISKCON and Interfaith: ISKCON in Relation to People of Faith in God’ (ISKCON Communications: 2004), p. 2.

46. Ibid., p. 4.

47. W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56 (1956), passim. See also J. Kekes, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 1977), p. 71).